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Abstract
In this study we analyse stock price reactions to share buyback announcements from
a tax perspective in Germany. To determine the inﬂuence of taxes on stock prices on
the announcement day of share buybacks two diﬀerent tax regimes – the corporate
imputation system and the classical corporate tax system – are analysed. Taking the
shareholder structure into account, we ﬁnd evidence that the share price reaction on
share repurchase announcements was signiﬁcantly larger under the full imputation sys-
tem than under the classical corporate tax system with shareholder relief. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd evidence for the substitution hypothesis and the dividend clientele eﬀect: High
dividend paying companies have smaller positive price reactions than non- or lower
dividend paying companies.
This research project is supported by the “Jubiläumsfonds“ of the Austrian National Bank (OeNB)
and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).Stock Price Reactions to Share Repurchase Announcements in Germany. A Tax Perspective.
1 Introduction
Are individuals’ and ﬁrms’ decisions aﬀected by taxes? This question is of high interest,
e.g. for policy makers. An area which is extremely suitable for answering this question
is the distribution policy of corporations and the reactions of their shareholders on
distributions, because diﬀerent forms of distributions are typically diﬀerently taxed.
These diﬀerent tax levels can be used to analyse whether ﬁrms choose tax-optimal
ways of distributing their free cash ﬂow and how shareholders value the tax savings.
Nevertheless, we know from the literature that diﬀerent distribution forms such as
dividends and share repurchases are inﬂuenced by many factors: Signaling eﬀects and
agency conﬂicts are good examples.1 Thus, it is rather complicated to separate the tax
inﬂuence on those decisions. One way of solving the problem is to analyse the eﬀect of
a tax reform on distributions and shareholders reactions.
An ideal setting for such an analysis can be found in Germany in the last ten years. In
2002, the corporate tax system was fundamentally reformed2 and the relation of taxes
on dividends and taxes on share repurchases has been radically changed. In Germany,
stock repurchases were generally prohibited until 1998. Since then, they have been an
increasingly popular instrument for distributing corporate proﬁts to shareholders. As
capital gains are taxed preferentially over dividends in Germany and in other countries,
taxation can be expected to have an impact on distribution policy.3
The corporate full imputation system which was in eﬀect since 1977 was replaced
by a classical corporation tax with shareholder relief elements. Before, the corporate
income tax on distributed proﬁts was fully credited against the shareholder’s personal
income tax liability. In contrast, capital gains did not entitle to tax credits. Since the
tax reform, the corporate income tax cannot be credited anymore. Only half of the
1 See Dittmar (2000); Grullon / Michaely (2004); Jagannathan / Stephens (2003) and Jagannathan
/ Stephens / Weisbach (2000) for the US and Hackethal / Zdantchouk (2004) for Germany.
2 See Schreiber (2000); Homburg (2000).
3 See f.i. Grullon / Michaely (2002) for the US; Amihud / Murgia (1997) for Germany.
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dividends are subject to the individual income tax (half-income system). Obviously,
the relative advantage of share repurchases over dividends changed due to the tax
reform. Capital gains from selling shares are taxable only if an individual shareholder
owns a substantial interest in the corporation. Tightening capital gains taxation by
lowering the critical threshold for substantial interest was another element of the tax
reform.
We analyse how this tax reform inﬂuences market reactions to stock repurchases. We
measure the market reaction on the announcement day of share repurchases. The ad
hoc announcement of a share repurchase is obligatory if the event has a likely impact
on share prices. In an event study, we compare abnormal returns around the ad hoc
announcement day before and after the tax reform, respectively. As capital gains
taxation depends on the shareholder’s stake in the corporation, we distinguish between
shareholders with a stake of more or less than 1% or 10% (between 1999 and 2001),
respectively. The investigation period covers the years 1998 to 2006 in order to include
several years before and after the corporate tax reform.
We ﬁnd evidence that the 2002 tax reform has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the share price
reaction on the announcement day of share buybacks. We observe a signiﬁcantly higher
share price reaction under the full imputation system in comparison to the half income
system. This evidence can also be found in a regression analysis where we separate tax
and non-tax inﬂuences.
Focussing on diﬀerently taxed shareholder groups, we fail to ﬁnd evidence supporting
our hypothesis that companies which are dominated by individual shareholders with
a high tax advantage from share repurchases show the highest share price reaction on
share buyback announcements. Instead, non-tax factors dominate the price reactions
on the announcement day. Nevertheless, by dividing the whole observation period into
the full imputation system and the half income system for our created shareholder
portfolios, we can show that the share price reaction for companies, which are domi-
2Stock Price Reactions to Share Repurchase Announcements in Germany. A Tax Perspective.
nated by individuals with substantial and non-substantial interest is larger under the
full imputation system than under the half income system.
A handful of other studies have looked at share price reactions to the announcement of
share buybacks in Germany.4 In distinction to our study, there does not exist empirical
work, which measures the eﬀects of diﬀerent tax systems on the share price reaction of
share buyback announcements in Germany.
Most closely related to this article are Grullon/ Michaely (2002). They ﬁnd a diﬀerent
share price reaction to share buyback announcements before and after the US Tax
Reform Act in 1986. They conclude that the decreasing tax advantage of capital gains
over dividends after the tax reform is responsible for the stock price reaction in the
US.5
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: section 2 describes the legal
framework, before our hypotheses are developed. Section 3 details the database and
the methodology. Section 4 presents the main results, including the event study and
the regression analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
2.1 Impact of share repurchase announcements on stock prices
Because of the tax advantage of capital gains over dividends there exists an incen-
tive for the substitution of dividends through share buybacks since the adoption of
the KonTraG in 1998 (substitution hypothesis).6 Alternatively, share buybacks can
4 Publications for the German stock markets are, for example: Schremper (2002), Gerke / Fischer /
Langer (2003), Pertlwieser (2006), Seifert (2006).
5 See Grullon / Michaely (2002), p. 1673–1674.
6 The German act “Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG)“ was
enacted on May, 1st 1998.
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be considered as complements to dividends (complement hypothesis). Companies can
be reluctant to cut dividend payments (Lintner-Model7) but want to implement share
buybacks in order to transfer extra-ordinary cash ﬂows to the shareholders. A div-
idend increase would be interpreted as a signal for permanently higher prospective
dividend payments. Therefore, a dividend increase is not practicable. In this case,
share buybacks are used as a new opportunity to transfer cash to the shareholders.
The basic fundamental principle to conduct this study is the semi-strong information
eﬃciency of the stock market.8 The semi-strong eﬃciency assumption implies that
the relative tax advantage of share buybacks over dividends must be priced into the
stock market rates on the announcement day of the share buyback. In a ﬁrst step, the
following alternative hypothesis proves whether the announcement of a share buyback
provides additional information for the stock market:
H1: The announcement of the share buyback has an information
content on the announcement day.
If the alternative hypothesis H1 can be approved, then the announcement of share
buybacks has an information content for the stock market. However, it is ambiguous
whether the tax reform has an inﬂuence on the stock market. In section 2.2 we show
that most shareholders gain more from a share buyback under the full imputation
system in comparison to the half income system. To analyze the eﬀects of the change
of the corporate tax system, we formulate a second alternative hypothesis:
H2: The size of the abnormal returns diﬀers between the half income
system and the full imputation system.
In a third step, we create several portfolios, which represent three diﬀerent dominant
shareholder groups, separated by tax law. The diﬀerent portfolios mirror the diﬀerent
7 See Lintner (1956).
8 A semi-strong eﬃcient stock market implies, that all publicly available information is already priced
into the stock market rates. See Fama (1970), p. 383 ﬀ.
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relative tax advantages of capital gains over dividends depending on the shareholder
structure. These diﬀerent tax advantages should be reﬂected by the stock price reaction
on the announcement day of the share buyback.
The ﬁrst portfolio consists of companies, whose shareholders are dominated (more than
50% of the voting rights) by individuals with non-substantial interest. The second
portfolio consists of companies, whose shareholders are dominated (more than 50% of
the voting rights) by individuals with substantial interest. The third portfolio consists
of companies, whose shareholders are dominated (more than 50% of the voting rights)
by corporations.9
To show the eﬀect of the tax reform 2002, every portfolio must be separated in two
subsamples. The ﬁrst subsample corresponds to the observation period from 1 May
1998 to 31 December 2001 (imputation system), the second subsample corresponds to
the observation period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2006 (half income system).
2.2 Taxation of shareholders
Prior to the tax reform, until 2001, dividends received from domestic corporations
entitled domestic individuals10 to a tax credit. As a consequence, distributed proﬁts
of corporations were eﬀectively subject only to the individual income tax at the tax
9 A portfolio consisting of companies which are dominated by investment funds is not formed. In-
vestment funds are taxed according to the transparency principle. Their taxation depends on the
tax status of their shareholders. In the following, investment funds are subsumed under individuals
with non-substantial interest.
10We consider the “ﬁrst shareholder level“. The taxation of “downstream shareholders“ is ignored.
Implicitly, it is assumed, that the shareholders are optimizing the cash ﬂow between them and their
company without recognizing – in case of a corporation – their own shareholders. This assumption
is reasonable, because a corporation as a ﬁrst level shareholder can optimise its cash ﬂow to its
owner after receiving dividends from its holdings.
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rate ¿i .11 The maximum personal income tax rate including solidarity surcharge12
decreased from 55.92% in 1998 to 44.31% in 2006. Long-term capital gains from stocks
held for more than one year were tax-exempt for shareholders with non-substantial
interest. The threshold for non-substantial interest was deﬁned as a stake of less than
25% up to 1998, a stake of less than 10% from 1999 to 2001, and a stake of less than
1% as from 2002. The underlying proﬁt was only subject to the corporate income tax
at the rate ¿c.
Until 2001, the value of retained proﬁts was higher than its pre-tax value because of
the inherent tax credit. Thus, domestic buyers of the shares were willing to pay for the
tax credit. Assuming that the whole tax credit was comprised in the price calculation
of the buyer, then the eﬀective tax rate of the seller was zero, because the corporate
tax payments were refunded by the buyer and no additional personal income taxes had
to be paid.13
In case of non-substantial interest, tax rates on dividends ¿d and capital gains ¿g under
the full imputation system are computed as ¿FI
d = ¿i and ¿FI
g = 0. Tax rates on
dividends ¿d and capital gains ¿g under the half-income system are computed as ¿HI
d =
¿c + (1 ¡ ¿c) ¢ 0:5 ¢ ¿i and ¿HI
g = ¿c.
Table 1 displays the eﬀective tax rates on dividends and capital gains. The diﬀerence
¢FI = ¿FI
d ¡ ¿FI
g of 55.92% indicates that capital gains carried a substantial tax
preference over dividends. As a consequence, there is a strong tax-induced incentive in
favor of share repurchases for high-income shareholders under the imputation system.
Under the half income system since 2002 corporate proﬁts were taxed at the corporate
11The German local business tax is neglected because it is levied on both retained and distributed
earnings and has not been changed systematically in the course of the 2002 tax reform.
12In the following, we will only take top marginal tax rates including solidarity surcharge into account.
The solidarity surcharge is a 5.5% tax on top of the personal income tax and the corporate income
tax. Germany has introduced this tax in order to ﬁnance the German reuniﬁcation.
13The maximum pretax value for 1 DM cash dividend is 1.4286 DM to a taxable German investor.
McDonald (2001) ﬁnds that the empirically tested value is 1.26 DM.
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Year System Threshold Dividend tax rate Capital gains tax rate Diﬀerence
¿d (%) ¿g (%) ¢ (%)
1998 FI 25% 55.92 0.00 55.92
1999 FI 10% 55.92 0.00 55.92
2000 FI 10% 53.81 0.00 53.81
2001 FI 10% 51.17 0.00 51.17
2002 HI 1% 45.21 26.38 18.83
2003 HI 1% 46.38 27.95 18.43
2004 HI 1% 43.86 26.38 17.48
2005 HI 1% 42.69 26.38 16.31
2006 HI 1% 42.69 26.38 16.31
Table 1: Tax rates on dividends and capital gains for shareholders with non-
substantial interest. FI: Full imputation system, HI: Half-income system.
income tax rate of 26.38%. Additionally, distributed proﬁts after corporate taxes were
subject to the half-income system on the individual level. A total tax burden of ¿HI
g =
26:38%+(1¡26:38%)¢0:5¢51:17% = 45:21% results. From the decreasing ¢-values it can
be seen that the tax incentive to repurchase stocks decreased substantially compared
to the full imputation system.
The decreasing tax preference for capital gains leads to the following hypothesis:
H2.1: Under the half-income system, the abnormal return for stock
repurchase announcements is lower than under the imputa-
tion system for corporations which are dominated by individual
shareholders with tax-exempt capital gains.
Capital gains of shareholders with substantial interest were taxable under both tax
systems. From 1998 to 2001, capital gains were fully taxed, but slightly reduced tax
rates ¿reduced
i were applied.14
14In 1998, capital gains were taxed at half of the individual income tax rate. In the following years,
preferential tax rates between 45.37% and 47.48% were applied to capital gains of shareholders with
substantial interest. Again we assume that the corporate income tax was refunded by the buyer
who received a claim on the tax credit.
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In case of substantial interest, the tax rates on dividends ¿d and capital gains ¿g under
the full imputation system are computed as ¿FI
d = ¿i and ¿FI
g = ¿reduced
i . The tax rates
on dividends ¿d and capital gains ¿g under the half-income system are computed as
¿HI
d = ¿HI
g = ¿c + (1 ¡ ¿c) ¢ 0:5 ¢ ¿i.
Year System Threshold Dividend tax rate Capital gains tax rate Diﬀerence
¿d (%) ¿g (%) ¢ (%)
1998 FI 25% 55.92 24.79 31.12
1999 FI 10% 55.92 47.48 8.44
2000 FI 10% 53.81 45.37 8.44
2001 FI 10% 51.17 45.37 5.80
2002 HI 1% 45.21 45.21 0
2003 HI 1% 46.38 46.38 0
2004 HI 1% 43.86 43.86 0
2005 HI 1% 42.69 42.69 0
2006 HI 1% 42.69 42.69 0
Table 2: Tax rates on dividends and capital gains for individual shareholders with
substantial interest. FI: Full imputation system, HI: Half-income system.
Obviously, the full imputation system for major shareholders provided strong incentives
to repurchase shares. Under the half-income system, major individual shareholders are
indiﬀerent between dividends and share repurchases.15
Summarizing, the incentives for share repurchases are lower under the half-income
system.
H2.2: Under the half-income system, the abnormal return for stock
repurchase announcements is lower than under the imputa-
tion system for corporations which are dominated by individual
shareholders with taxable capital gains.
15The diﬀerent incentives between the full imputation system and the half income system are even
higher when we take the decrease of the threshold for substantial interest into account. Capital
gains that were formerly tax-exempt became taxable due to the reduction of the substantial interest
threshold.
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Under the full imputation system, dividends received by other corporations, henceforth
corporate shareholders, were fully taxed on the corporate level. However, a full tax
credit was granted to corporate shareholders. As a result, corporate income tax was
levied exactly once, regardless of the corporate structure. In contrast, capital gains did
not entitle to a tax credit. Again we assume that the buyer was willing to pay for the
tax credit because it reduces the later dividend taxation. Thus, the tax rate for capital
gains was the statutory corporate tax rate.
The tax rates on dividends ¿d and capital gains ¿g of corporations under the full im-
putation system are computed as ¿FI
d = ¿FI
g = ¿c. Under the half income system, the
corporate tax rate was reduced and capital gains and dividends were 95% tax-exempt
for corporations with no tax credit granted. Thus, both alternatives are taxed identi-
cally. The tax rates on dividends ¿d and capital gains ¿g under the half-income system
are computed as ¿HI
d = ¿HI
g = ¿c + (1 ¡ ¿c) ¢ 0:05 ¢ ¿c.
Table 3 shows the tax advantage of capital gains over dividends for corporations as
shareholders.
Year System Dividend tax rate Capital gains tax rate Diﬀerence
¿d (%) ¿g (%) ¢ (%)
1998 FI 47.48 47.48 0
1999 FI 42.20 42.20 0
2000 FI 42.20 42.20 0
2001 FI 42.20 42.20 0
2002 HI 27.35 27.35 0
2003 HI 28.96 28.96 0
2004 HI 27.35 27.35 0
2005 HI 27.35 27.35 0
2006 HI 27.35 27.35 0
Table 3: Tax rates on dividends and capital gains for corporate shareholders FI: Full
imputation system, HI: Half-income system.
If corporations are the dominant shareholder, then there is no tax advantage of cap-
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ital gains (share buybacks) over dividends.16 This result implies that the stock price
reaction between the two samples should not diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
H2.3: The abnormal return does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the
two samples (imputation system versus half income system) if
corporations are the dominant shareholders.
2.3 Alternative measures for tax eﬀects
Tax eﬀects are measured directly by tax variable dummys and, indirectly, through
proxy variables. The proxy variables are the adjusted dividend and the dividend yield.
Hypothesis H3 approves the relationship between the abnormal return and the adjusted
dividend payment in the event window. If there is a substitution eﬀect, then the ab-
normal returns should decrease with an increasing adjusted dividend. Higher dividend
payments reduce the potential for prospective share buybacks. If share buybacks are
used as complements, then the abnormal returns should increase with an increasing
adjusted dividend.
H3: An increasing dividend inﬂuences the share price reaction in the
event window (substitution versus complement hypothesis).
Apart from the substitution eﬀect, the dividend clientele eﬀect could provide an ex-
planatory content under a tax perspective. Corporations, which follow a high dividend
yield strategy, could be dominated by shareholders with a low marginal income tax
rate. If these corporations try to substitute dividends through share buybacks, their
shareholders should proﬁt less than shareholders with a high marginal income tax rate.
16There could be diﬀerent reasons to carry out share buybacks, such as changes of the capital structure
or stock option plans. These reasons can lead to positive stock price reactions on the announcement
day of share buybacks in spite of the tax irrelvance.
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H4: Corporations with a higher dividend yield show a lower share
price reaction in the event window.
3 Sample and data description
3.1 Data base
Electronically distributed ad hoc announcements serve as the data base to identify
share buyback announcements.17 The time frame investigated starts on 1 May 1998
and ends on 31 December 2006. 418 ad hoc announcements of 244 German CDAX
companies have been identiﬁed.18
Stock returns on a daily basis were calculated by using data obtained from the Datas-
tream data base by Thomson Financial.19 The Datastream data base also provides
dividends per share, the market value and the index membership to the “New Market
Index“ of all companies in the investigated sample. The shareholder structure is taken
from the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer.
3.2 Selection criteria
Table 4 shows the process of adjusting the data for our analysis:
17The following data bases are searched for ad hoc announcements of companies which are listed
on the stock exchange: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc Mitteilungen (www.dgap.de), Hugin
(www.huginonline.de), Euro adhoc Portal (www.euroadhoc.com).
18Companies which were not listed on the CDAX at the time of announcement were excluded from
the analysis. CDAX measures the development of the German stock market. Companies which are
traded at the over-the-counter market are excluded. See Deutsche Börse (2007a), p. 9.
19The share prices are adapted to the Return Index. The Return Index adjusts for dividends and
capital changes and uses the (Xetra) closing prices of the respective domain stock exchange. For
better comparability the CDAX Performance index, based on the closing prices of the domain stock
exchange, is used to calculate the market rate of return.
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Data Adjustments Number of Announcements
starting point 418
preferred stocks 3
unknown event date –33
sec. 71 subsec. 1 nr. 1–7 AktG –3
“contaminated“ ad hocs –50
overlapping ad hocs –16
over-the-counter trading –5
missing data for estimation period –7
Total 307
Table 4: Data adjustment.
Starting point of the analysis are 418 ad hoc announcements.20 Our own investigation
must be reduced by three announcements which lead to a stock repurchase according
to sec. 71 subsec. 1 nr. 1–7 AktG.21 Five announcements are excluded because com-
panies are traded over the counter. Ad hoc announcements for common and preferred
stock are considered twice in the investigation. This increases our own dataset by three
ad hoc announcements. Since it was not possible to identify the exact date for 33 ad
hoc announcements these were eliminated. 50 ad hoc announcements containing addi-
tional information for the capital market besides the stock repurchase announcement
are eliminated, because market reactions may not result from the share buyback an-
nouncements only.22 16 announcements which overlap in the event window are deleted
to guarantee that the calculated returns in the event window are not biased by ad-
ditional occurrences. 7 announcements are deleted because return data are missing
for the total estimation period. The ﬁnal dataset consists of a total of 307 ad hoc
announcements.
20153 of these announcements are based upon our own investigation for the time period between 1
April 2003 and 31 December 2006. 265 ad hoc announcements are based upon a data base used in
Pertlwieser (2006) for the time between 1 May 1998 and 31 March 2003.
21An adjustment for ad hoc announcements according to sec. 71 subsec. 1 nr. 1–7 AktG is necessary
because those share buybacks relate to non-payout policy conditions.
22Additional information could be: suggestions to raise dividends, change of managing board or
supervisory board, business year forecasts or purchase of business units.
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3.3 Methodology
In order to analyse the hypotheses from section 2, an event study is applied to quantify
the capital market reaction to stock repurchase announcements.23
First, we model the returns for the estimation window which is deﬁned as the return
that would be expected if the event did not take place. Second, we calculate the
deviation of the actual return from the expected return, and the so-called abnormal
return is tested for signiﬁcance. If the abnormal return diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the
expected return at the time of the event (stock repurchase announcement), then the
announcement contains relevant information for the stock market. Then we investigate
whether the abnormal return changes signiﬁcantly as the full imputation system is
replaced by the half-income system.
The market model24 is estimated by calculating the alpha and beta factor for the
estimation window and serves to model the expected return of the event window:
Rit = ®i + ¯i ¢ Rmt + ²it; (1)
E(²it) = 0;V ar(²it) = ¾
2: (2)
The deviation between the realized return Rit and the expected return ^ ®i + ^ ¯i ¢ Rmt is
deﬁned as the abnormal return:
ARit = Rit ¡ ^ ®i ¡ ^ ¯i ¢ Rmt: (3)
Rit is the logarithmic return of security i on day t, whereas Rmt is the logarithmic return
of the CDAX performance index on day t. ®i und ¯i are the estimating parameters of
23See Schremper (2002), p. 123–130.
24See MacKinlay (1997), p. 18.
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the market model, which are calculated according to formula (1) for a 125-days window
from –145 to –21 days by applying the least squares method and ²it is the error term of
security i on day t. The market model assumes a linear timely uncorrelated relationship
between the market return and the security return and a normal distribution of the
abnormal returns with a zero conditional mean.25
The calculated daily abnormal returns for each security i (ARit) from a sample with N







ARit with t = ¡20;:::;20: (4)
To draw conclusions concerning a longer period of time we aggregate the daily abnormal
returns of every security i (ARit) for the event windows before [–20;–2], during [–
1;1], and after [2; 20] the announcement. This leads to cumulated abnormal returns
(CARi(t1;t2)) of security i for the respective periods from t1 to t2. For the average







We use the two-sided t-test and the Wilcoxon rank sum test for testing the hypothe-
ses. The t-test is based on the assumption of a normal distribution which could be
contradicted. Thus, the Wilcoxon rank sum test27 is used to check the test statistic.
In the course of univariate statistics we derive abnormal returns. In the multivariate
statistics we explain their inﬂuencing factors – especially tax aspects – by applying
a regression analysis. As a ﬁrst explanatory variable we introduce the Syst dummy
25See Campbell / Lo / MacKinlay (1997), p. 151–155.
26An alternative aggregation is to aggregate the average abnormal returns AARt. Both methods diﬀer
by the variance. See Campbell / Lo / MacKinlay (1997), p. 160 ﬀ.
27The Wilcoxon rank sum test is a non-parametric test which can also be used for small samples since
it is not based on any particular distribution.
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variable. This variable divides the whole observation period into a period under the
full imputation system (1 May 1998 to 31 December 2001) and into a period under the
half income system (1 January 2002 to 31 December 2006).
In a further model alternative dummy variables (NonSubSysi;t, SubSysi;t and
CorpSysi;t) are used to test hypotheses H2.1 to H2.3. For example, the dummy vari-
able NonSubSysi;t has a value of one if non-substantial interest shareholders dominate
the corporation (at least 50% share property) and the share buyback announcement
was made under the full imputation system. Otherwise the dummy variable has a value
of zero. For the dummy variables SubSysi;t and CorpSysi;t the dominant shareholders
change.
We also include dividend per share DPSi;t as another tax proxy in the regression. It
serves as a further estimator of possible substitution eﬀects between dividends and
stock repurchases. A next tax relevant variable which is integrated in the regression
model is the dividend yield per share DivYi;t. It is used to show a possible dividend
clientele eﬀect.
As control variables we include the fraction of non-substantial ownership in percent.
Further we include the company size to control for the signalling hypothesis. Small
companies are expected to have a higher information asymmetry between investors and
management.28 Investors from companies with low growth rates and high cash ﬂows
should proﬁt stronger from share buyback programs, because non-proﬁtable invest-
ments are prevented. To control for this argument, we integrate the net operating cash
ﬂows (NOCFi;t) and the price-to-book-ratio (PBRatioi;t) in our model. Further, share
buybacks can be used to change the capital structure of an company. The optimization
of the capital structure could lead to lower weighted costs of capital.29 To control for
this eﬀect the leverage ratio (Levi;t) is included into the regression. Further, a dummy
28See Vermaelen (1981), p. 164.
29See Schremper (2003), p. 593–597.
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variable for bull and bear markets, and a dummy variable for an index membership
in the “New Market Index“, which was established in 1998 and closed on 5 June 2003
is integrated in the regression. The observation period was dominated from a rising
(bull market) and falling stock market (bear market). The perception of investors can
be inﬂuenced by diﬀerent market situations.30 We use the control variable “NewMi;t“
to detect companies listed on the “New Market Index“. Thereby we can ﬁgure out the
inﬂuence of the market segmentation on the results.31
An overview of the regression variables is given in table 12 in the appendix.
The regression equations used are estimated according to the method of ordinary least
squares. We adjust standard errors according to White (1980).
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows the number of share buyback announcements depending on the domi-
nant shareholder group.
In the whole time period, exept for the year 2003, corporations dominated by non-
substantial interest shareholders announce the majority of share buybacks (43,22%).
Under the full imputation system (1998 to 2001) we observe higher amounts of share
buyback announcements (average per year: 38,75) in comparison to the time period un-
der the half income system (average per year: 31). Corporations with non-substantial
interest shareholders have higher numbers of share buyback announcements under the
full imputation system (average per year: 15,25) than under the half income system
30See Gombola / Liu (1993).
31For univariate statistics Gerke et al. (2003) carried out diﬀerent results (AARt) for diﬀerent market
segments at the announcement days, see Gerke / Fischer / Langer (2003).
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Figure 1: Numbers of share buyback announcements depending on shareholder struc-
ture.
(average per year: 14,6).
4.2 Univariate statistics
Table 5 shows the results for the total time period considered:
time period CAR(t1;t2)/ AARt t-value z-value
–1 –0.012% –0.06 –0.50
0 4.595%¤¤¤ 12.75 12.64
1 0.383% 1.59 1.49
–20 to –2 –3.578%¤¤¤ –3.75 –4.21
2 to 20 0.981% 1.25 1.38
–1 to 1 4.966%¤¤¤ 10.98 10.44
Notation: t- and z-values are signiﬁcant with 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 to the 10%-(¤), 5%-(¤¤)
and 1%-(¤¤¤) level of signiﬁcance.
Table 5: Average abnormal return (AARt) and cumulated average abnor-
mal return CAR(t1;t2) for the whole observation period.
The ﬁrst column of table 5 shows the average abnormal return (AARt) one day before
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[–1], on the event day [0] and on the day after the event [1]. The values [–20;–2] and [2;
20] represent the time period before and after the event day. For this time period we
calculate the cumulated average abnormal return CAR(t1;t2). The second and third
columns display the t-value and the z-value of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative abnormal share price development of –3.578% for the
time period [–20;2]. Corporate managers tend to announce share buybacks especially
after a signiﬁcant decline of share prices. A possible explanation for the announcement
could be undervaluation perceived by the management (signaling). On the day prior to
the announcement [–1] there is no signiﬁcant positive abnormal return. Thus, insider
trading before the stock repurchase announcement is unlikely. On the announcement
day we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive price jump of 4.595%. The announcement is judged
positive by the stock market.
As a result we ﬁnd evidence supporting the alternative hypothesis H1. The stock
repurchase announcement contains relevant information for the stock market.
The considered sample of the total time period is divided into two subsamples with
diﬀering time periods. The ﬁrst subsample serves to investigate share price reactions
to announcements at the time of the full imputation system. The second subsample
looks at share price reactions when the half-income system is applied.
Table 10 in the appendix shows the results for the two samples. Figure 2 displays the
results graphically.
Figure 2 demonstrates that on the announcement day share price reactions are higher
und the full imputation system (4.977% vs. 4.210%). However, the diﬀerence between
the two samples is not signiﬁcant.
Looking at the average cumulated abnormal return over [–1;1] as opposed to the average
abnormal return on the event day we observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the full
imputation system and the half income system. The average cumulated abnormal
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Figure 2: History of the average cumulated abnormal return CAR(t1;t2), separated
by the tax regime.
return under the full imputation system is 6.068%. For the same time period [–1;1] it
is 3.856% under the half-income system. We can conclude that the average cumulated
abnormal return [–1;1] diﬀers signiﬁcantly between the full imputation system and
the half-income system.32 The alternative hypothesis 2, measured by the cumulated
abnormal returns [-1;1], is supported in the univeriate statistics. Considering the whole
sample investors seem to anticipate tax diﬀerences.
Nevertheless, the presented results for the total sample could be inﬂuenced substan-
tially by diﬀerent shareholder structures of the ﬁrm. The diﬀerent tax treatment of
shareholder groups could bias the share price reactions.
For the investigation of the alternative hypotheses H2.1 to H2.3 we divide the total
sample into three portfolios. Portfolio 1 contains the ad hoc announcements of compa-
nies with at least 50% shareholders with non-substantial interest. Portfolio 2 consists
of companies which are dominated by shareholders of substantial interest with at least
32This conclusion is based on the t-test as well as on the Wilcoxon signed-rank test which is not based
on any particular distribution and does not overweight outliers.
19Stock Price Reactions to Share Repurchase Announcements in Germany. A Tax Perspective.
50% of the votes. Companies in portfolio 3 are dominated by corporations with at least
50% of the votes.
Figure 3 shows the development of the average cumulated abnormal returns CAR(t1;t2)
for each shareholder group over time.
Figure 3: History of the average cumulated abnormal return CAR(t1;t2) for the whole
observation period, separated shareholder groups.
Table 11 in the appendix displays the average abnormal returns (AARt) and the average
cumulated abnormal returns CAR[¡1;1] for all three portfolios for the total time period
considered.
On the event day [0] ad hoc announcements of companies with shareholders of substan-
tial interest show the most signiﬁcant share price reactions of AAR0 = 5:836%. Regard-
ing the average cumulated abnormal return [–1; 1] the share price reaction increases to
signiﬁcant 6.475%. In contrast, companies with shareholders of non-substantial inter-
est display a signiﬁcant abnormal return of 3.308% on the day of the announcement
and an average cumulated abnormal return of 3.377% over [–1;1]. For companies with
mainly corporate shareholders the average abnormal return is 4.443% on the event day.
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The average cumulated abnormal return over [–1; 1] is 4.679% for this portfolio.
From a tax perspective one would expect share price reactions to be the highest for
companies with mainly shareholders with non-substantial interest since the sharehold-
ers of these companies proﬁt most from realizing capital gains. One would also expect
share price reactions to be lower for companies with mainly shareholders with sub-
stantial interest since these shareholders proﬁt less in comparison to shareholders with
non-substantial interest. This argument applies even more for corporate sharehold-
ers. From a tax perspective corporations have no tax advantage for capital gains over
dividends. The share price reaction is expected to be the lowest if corporations are
dominant shareholders.
A possible explanation for these results can be found in the signaling theory. Ad hoc an-
nouncements by companies with mostly shareholders of substantial interest display the
highest abnormal negative share price development. Due to the corporate governance
structure information policy could be worse and information asymmetry larger in the
case of dominating shareholders with substantial interest. The reduction of increased
information asymmetry could lead to higher price reactions on the announcement day.
Another possible explanation for the results is liquidity and trading volume of the
share. Shares with a high stake of non-substantial shareholders are more frequently
traded than shares with a low stake. High liquidity could lead to lower price reactions
due to better information processing as opposed to shares with lower liquidity.
For testing the hypotheses H2.1 to H2.3 it is necessary to divide the portfolios into two
time periods: the full imputation and the half income system.
Table 6 shows the average abnormal returns and the cumulated average returns [–1; 1]
for the full imputation and the half income system regarding companies dominated by
shareholders with non-substantial interest.
From table 6 we can see the signiﬁcantly positive price reaction on the event day which
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FI (N=63) HI (N=75) Diﬀerence
time CAR t value z value CAR t value z value t value z value
/ AARt / AARt
–1 –0.325% –0.820 –0.815 –0.171% –0.735 –0.544 0.332 0.317
0 3.483%¤¤¤ 8.401 6.490 3.160%¤¤¤ 6.507 5.856 –0.506 –1.019
1 1.231%¤¤¤ 2.813 2.561 –0.439% –1.364 –1.548 –3.028 –2.786
–1 to +1 4.400%¤¤¤ 4.950 4.945 2.521%¤¤¤ 4.162 3.450 –1.720 –1.521
Notation:t- and z-values are signiﬁcant with 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 to the 10%-(¤), 5%-(¤¤)
and 1%-(¤¤¤) level of signiﬁcance.
Table 6: Average abnormal return AARt and average cumulated abnormal
return CAR(¡1;1) for individuals with non-substantial interest as share-
holders, separated by the tax regime.
is 3.483% under the full imputation system (FI) and 3.160% under the half income
system (HI). From the t- and z-values we know that the two samples do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly. Nevertheless we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two samples one
day after the announcement day [+1]. AAR1 takes on signiﬁcant 1.231% under FI
and insigniﬁcant –0.439% under HI. The distributions of abnormal returns on the day
after the event also diﬀer signiﬁcantly. If we calculate the cumulated average abnormal
return for [–1;1] we get a signiﬁcant value of 4.400% under FI and a signiﬁcant result
of 2.521% under HI. The distribution of the cumulated abnormal returns between the
two samples is only weakly signiﬁcant according to the t-value but not the z-value.
Table 7 displays the average abnormal return AARt and the average cumulated ab-
normal return CAR(¡1;1) under the full imputation and the half income system for
companies with dominating shareholders of substantial interest:
The diﬀerence of CAR[¡1;+1] between full imputation and half income system is
signiﬁcant, which supports hypothesis H2. As a result, tax aspects seem to play a role
in this portfolio.
Table 9 shows the average abnormal return AARt and the average cumulated abnormal
return CAR(¡1;1) for companies dominated by corporations under the full imputation
and the half income system.
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FI (N=49) HI (N=26) Diﬀerence
time CAR t value z value CAR t value z value t value z value
/ AARt / AARt
–1 1.211% ¤ 1.652 1.726 –0.566% –0.662 –0.648 –1.577 –1.492
0 5.830%¤¤¤ 5.161 4.690 5.847%¤¤¤ 5.146 4.077 0.011 0.356
1 1.127% 1.173 1.318 –1.997%¤ –2.301 –1.765 –2.413 –2.215
–1 to +1 8.168%¤¤¤ 5.129 4.945 3.284%¤¤ 1.973 3.450 –2.120 –1.815
Notation: t- and z-values are signiﬁcant with 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 to the 10%-(¤), 5%-(¤¤)
and 1%-(¤¤¤) level of signiﬁcance.
Table 7: Average abnormal return AARt and average cumulated abnormal
return CAR(¡1;1) for individuals with substantial interest as shareholders,
separated by the tax regime.
FI (N=14) HI (N=25) Diﬀerence
time CAR t value z value CAR t value z value t value z value
/ AARt / AARt
–1 –1.684%¤ –1.965 –1.161 0.327% 0.634 –0.525 1.601 0.937
0 3.999%¤¤¤ 3.934 2.668 4.692%¤¤ 2.553 3.162 0.303 0.966
1 0.548% 1.663 0.973 0.677% 0.740 0.229 0.128 –0.615
–1 to +1 2.862%¤¤ 2.682 2.103 5.696%¤¤¤ 2.987 3.081 1.190 1.083
Notation:t- and z-values are signiﬁcant with 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 to the 10%-(¤), 5%-(¤¤)
and 1%-(¤¤¤) level of signiﬁcance.
Table 8: Average abnormal return AARt and average cumulated abnormal
return CAR(¡1;1) for corporations as shareholders, separated by the tax
regime.
Share buybacks have no advantages over dividends for corporations as shareholders.
This is true for FI and HI. Therefore, we do not expect diﬀering price reactions between
HI and FI according to the alternative hypothesis H2.3. Considering the results from
table 9 we can ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences regarding the distribution of abnormal
returns on the event day [0].
Note that the small sample size reduces the signiﬁcance of the results for portfolios with
substantial interest and corporations. Nevertheless, if we combined the two portfolios
we could not validate the hypotheses which were developed on the basis of our calcu-
lations. This is why signiﬁcance could only be increased and standard errors decreased
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by larger samples which can be obtained in the future.
4.3 Multivariate Statistics
In this section a regression analysis is used to isolate the tax eﬀects on the average
cumulated abnormal return [–1; 1]. In regression (1) the switch of the tax regime from
the imputation system to the half income system is integrated with a dummy variable
(Syst). Alternatively, in regression (2) the dummy variable (Syst) is removed and
replaced by the the dummy variables “NonSubSysi;t“, “SubSysi;t“ and “CorpSysi;t“,
deﬁned in section 3.3. These dummy variables are necessary to test hypotheses H2.1
to H2.3.
As additional explanatory variables for the substitution eﬀect the adjusted dividend
per share (DPSi;t) and the dividend yield (DivYi;t) on the announcement day of the
share buyback is used. As control variables the company size (Sizei;t), the Net Oper-
ating Cash Flows (NOCFi;t), the Price-Book-Ratio (PBRatioi;t), the Leverage Ratio
(Levi;t), the cumulated abnormal returns (CAR[¡20;¡2]i;t), a dummy variable con-
trolling for bull and bear markets (StockExt), and a dummy variable controlling for
“New Market“ (NewMi;t) companies is used.33 The variable ²i is the residual.
Formally, regression model 1 is estimated:
CARi[¡1;1] = ® + ¯1 ¢ Syst + ¯2 ¢ NonSubi;t + ¯3 ¢ DPSi;t
+¯4 ¢ DivYi;t + ¯5 ¢ Sizei;t + ¯6 ¢ NOCFi;t + ¯7 ¢ PBRatioi;t (6)
+¯8 ¢ Lev + ¯9 ¢ CARi;[¡20;¡2] + ¯10 ¢ StockExt + ¯11 ¢ NewMi;t + ²i:
In regression model 2 three dummy variables (NonSubSysi;t, SubSysi;t, CorpSysi;t) are
33The details of the deﬁnitions of these variables are explained in section 3.3.
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integrated to test hypothesis H2.1 to H2.3. Because of multicollinearity the tax system
dummy variable (Syst) and the variable, controlling for non-subtantial shareholders
(NonSubi;t), are eliminated. Formally, regression model (2) has the following equation:
CARi[¡1;1] = ® + ¯1 ¢ NonSubSysi;t + ¯2 ¢ SubSysi;t + ¯3 ¢ CorpSysi;t
+¯4 ¢ DPSi;t + ¯5 ¢ DivYi;t + ¯6 ¢ Sizei;t + ¯7 ¢ NOCFi;t + ¯8 ¢ PBRatioi;t (7)
+¯9 ¢ Levi;t + ¯10 ¢ CARi;[¡20;¡2] + ¯11 ¢ StockExt + ¯12 ¢ NewMi;t + ²i:
Table 9 shows the results of the estimated regression model 1 and 2 for the whole
observation period (1 May 1998 to 31 December 2006):
The explanatory power of both regression models 1 and 2 is rather limited (R2=16.46%
and R2=15.72%). Nevertheless, the estimated regression explains the tax inﬂuence on
the cumulated abnormal return (CAR[–1; 1]). The coeﬃcient of the tax system vari-
able Syst is signiﬁcantly positive. The cumulated average abnormal return (CAR[–1;
1]) is signiﬁcantly higher (2.04%) under the imputation system in comparison to the
half-income system. The alternative hypothesis H2 is also supported in the multi-
variate setting. The coeﬃcient of the fraction of non-substantial interest shareholders
(NonSubi;t) is very small and not signiﬁcant. In regression 1 we could not ﬁnd evidence
that an increasing fraction of non-substantial interest shareholders leads to higher share
price reactions. In regression (2) we test hypotheses H2.1 to H2.3. The signs of all
three dummy variables (NonSubSysi;t, SubSysi;t and CorpSysi;t) are positive as we
expect, but the results are insigniﬁcant. This means, hypothesis H2.1 and H2.2 are
not supported in the multivariate setting. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd evidence supporting
alternative hypothesis H2.3, because the diﬀerent price reactions between the full im-
putation system and the half income system are not signiﬁcant, as we expected. This
means, corporations which are dominated by corporate shareholders show similar price
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Regression (1) Regression (2)
Variable Coeﬃcient t value Coeﬃcient t value
Sys 0.02038¤¤ 2.34 – –
Non-Sub –0.00002 –0.14 – –
NonSubSys – – 0.00872 0.81
SubSys – – 0.02235 1.51
CorpSys – – 0.01988 0.96
DPS –0.00478¤¤ –2.41 –0.00429¤¤ –2.37
DivY –0.36880¤ –1.83 –0.29684 –1.56
Size –0.00340¤¤ –1.99 –0.00368¤¤ –2.14
NOCF 0.00402¤¤¤ 2.85 0.00356¤¤ 2.26
PB-Ratio –0.00120 –0.80 –0.00080 –0.53
Lev 0.00000 0.73 0.00000 0.80
BHAR[–20;–2] –0.08200 –1.55 –0.08239 –1.62
StockEx –0.02055¤¤ –2.34 –0.02360¤¤¤ –2.71
NewM 0.02478 1.58 0.02401 1.49
Intercept 0.07018¤¤¤ 3.88 0.07367¤¤¤ 4.60
N 249 256
R2 0.16458 0.15717
F(11;237) 3.72291 F(12;243) 3.4022
Signiﬁcance levels ¤ 10% ¤¤ 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ 1%
Table 9: Regression results for Regression model 1 and 2.
Annotation: Because of heteroskedasticity we corrected the standard errors in model (1) and (2) according to White
(1980). We checked for multicollinearity by calculating the Pearson-correlation matrix and the variance inﬂation factors
(largest VIF: 1.31 in model (1) and 1.32 in model (2)). The values are in an acceptable range. Because of the sample
size we decided us for a cross-section regression analysis. Therefore we did not check for autocorrelation.
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reactions under the full imputation system as under the half income system.34
The coeﬃcient of the adjusted dividend per share (DPSi;t) and the signiﬁcant impact
serve as evidence supporting the substitution hypothesis. Companies with higher divi-
dend payments have a lower potential for further share buybacks. Therefore, the value
of share buybacks decreases for investors, which induces smaller share price reactions.
We also ﬁnd evidence for the dividend clientele eﬀect. Higher dividend yields lead to
smaller share price reactions (signiﬁcant in model 1, but not signiﬁcant in model 2),
because companies with a high dividend yield are dominated by investors with a low
marginal income tax rate. The control variable “Sizei;t“ aﬀects the cumulated abnor-
mal return [–1; 1]. An increasing company size leads to signiﬁcantly lower share price
reactions in regression 1 and 2. This result is a further evidence for the signalling
hypothesis.35 The coeﬃcient of the variable “NOCFi;t“ is positively signiﬁcant at the
1% level in model 1 and 2. Investors prefer companies which reduce liquidity by buying
back shares (Free Cash ﬂow Hypothesis). The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable for
the bull and bear markets StockExt shows a signiﬁcantly lower share price reaction
(2.05% in model 1 and 2.36% in model 2) in an increasing stock market compared to
a decreasing stock market. The investors sentiment change with the market situation.
5 Conclusion
From a tax perspective, share buybacks have a tax advantage over cash dividends. It
can be shown that the change of the tax system on 1 January 2002 has a signiﬁcant
34Alternatively to the regression models 1 and 2, the switch of the tax regime in 2002 can be analysed
by integrating the shareholder structure into artiﬁcially generated tax variables. The Tax-1 variable
uses the tax advantage (capital gains over dividend taxation) of the dominant shareholder group.
In contrast, the Tax-2 variable weights the tax advantage with the shareholder structure. The
coeﬃcients of the Tax-1 and Tax-2 variables in the regression models are positive but they are not
signiﬁcant. The result do not support the hypotheses that a higher tax advantage of capital gains
over dividends should lead to higher share price reactions (hypotheses H2.1 to H2.3).
35See Vermaelen (1981), p. 164.
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inﬂuence on the share price reaction on the announcement day of share buybacks. We
observe a signiﬁcantly higher share price reaction under the full imputation system in
comparison to the half income system. This result is consistent with our predictions.
Due to the tax reform 2002 the relative tax advantage of capital gains over dividends
decreased.
In a second step we created portfolios consisting of diﬀerent shareholder groups with
diﬀerent tax characteristics. As a result, companies which are dominated by individual
shareholders with substantial interest show the highest signiﬁcant share price reaction.
The portfolio, which is dominated by non-substantial shareholders shows the lowest
signiﬁcant share price reaction. This result contradicts our prediction, because the tax
advantage of share buybacks is the highest for non-substantial shareholders. Obviously,
non-tax factors dominate the price reactions on the announcement day.
Dividing the whole observation period into the full imputation system and the half
income system and if we retain the created portfolios, we can show that the share
price reaction for companies, which are dominated by individuals with substantial and
non-substantial interest is larger under the full imputation system than under the half
income system. This result is consistent with our prediction. The tax advantage for
share buybacks over dividends is higher under the full imputation system.
In a third step we use a regression analysis and try to separate tax factors from non-
tax factors inﬂuencing the share price reaction on the announcement day. In the
multivariate setting the tax-variables support the proposition, that the share price
reactions are higher under the full imputation system in comparison to the shareholder
relief system. Further results support the substitution hypothesis and the dividend
clientele eﬀect. Non-tax factors, f. i. the company size and the net operating cash
ﬂows, have a strong inﬂuence on the share price reaction at the announcement day
of share buybacks. These factors contribute signiﬁcantly to the explanation of share
buyback announcements.
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Appendix
FI HI Diﬀerence
time CAR t value z value CAR t value z value t value z value
/ AARt / AARt
–1 0.042% 0.120 0.084 –0.067% –0.281 –0.832 –0.258 –0.492
0 4.977%¤¤¤ 9.267 9.016 4.210%¤¤¤ 8.774 8.795 –1.066 –0.872
1 1.049%¤¤¤ 2.732 3.041 –0.287% –1.021 –1.195 –2.808 –3.097
–20 to –2 –4.297%¤¤¤ –2.663 –3.464 –2.855%¤¤¤ –2.808 –2.281 0.756 1.368
2 to 20 –0.328% –0.297 –0.769 2.249%¤¤¤ 2.324 2.903 1.645 2.430
–1 to 1 6.068%¤¤¤ 8.710 8.103 3.856%¤¤¤ 6.841 6.542 –2.469 –1.976
Notation: t- and z-values are signiﬁcant with 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 to the 10%-(¤), 5%-(¤¤)
and 1%-(¤¤¤) level of signiﬁcance.
Table 10: Average abnormal returns AARt and average cumulated abnor-
mal ruturns CAR(t1;t2), separated by the tax regime.
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Dominance criteria time CAR t value z value
/ AARt
non-sub (N=138) –1 –0.239% –1.095 –1.030
0 3.308%¤¤¤ 10.21 8.749
1 0.321% 1.173 0.601
–1 to +1 3.377%¤¤¤ 6.414 5.964
sub (N=75) –1 0.595% 1.046 1.072
0 5.836%¤¤¤ 7.015 6.168
1 0.044% 0.062 0.106
–1 to +1 6.475%¤¤¤ 5.336 4.774
corp (N=39) –1 –0.395% –0.729 –0.949
0 4.443%¤¤¤ 3.516 4.145
1 0.631% 1.047 0.572
–1 to +1 4.679%¤¤¤ 3.516 3.768
Notation: t- and z-values are signiﬁcant with 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 to the 10%-(¤), 5%-(¤¤)
and 1%-(¤¤¤) level of signiﬁcance.
Table 11: Average abnormal returns AARt and average cumulated ab-
normal ruturns CAR(t1;t2), separated by the shareholder structure for the
whole observation period.
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Syst Hypothesis 2 1 FI +
0 HI
NonSubSysi;t Hypothesis 2.1 1 FI and non-substantial interest +
0 otherwise
SubSysi;t Hypothesis 2.2 1 FI and substantial interest +
0 otherwise
CorpSysi;t Hypothesis 2.3 1 FI and corporation not sig.
0 otherwise
DPSi;t Hypothesis 3 div i;t






NonSub shareholder structure non-sub. interest shareholders (%) +
0 otherwise
Sizei;t Signalling ln (marketvaluei;t) –
NOCFi;t Liquidity











Book Value of Liabilitiesi;t
Book Value of Equityi;t
–
StockExt bull/bear market 1 rising stock markets +
0 falling stock markets
NewMi;t Segmentation 1 for listing in „New Market“ segment +
0 otherwise
Table 12: Overview of Regression Variables.
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